Abstract
This study examines the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS’ bid to resolve the conflict in Mali. In line with her leading role, Nigeria had played a major role in preventing further loss of lives and property, and restored democracy in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, with the current security situation in Nigeria, a sub-regional leader, it raised concern on what the country has done in the security and constitutional conflict in Mali. In this study, the specific objectives were to assess: Nigeria’s role, explanation for the intervention, and factors that affected her performance in Mali. It is the assumption of this study that; Nigeria’s involvement in managing the conflict in Mali was to enhance its national interest and policy of promoting sub-regional peace and security, Nigeria did not play a leadership role in ECOWAS’ effort to resolve the conflict in Mali and that Nigeria’s domestic challenges, especially internal insecurity militated against her performance. The Hegemonic Stability Theory was employed to explain Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS intervention in Mali. This theory argued that Institutions designed to help states in cooperating with one another are more likely to be created and maintained when there is a powerful state that is capable of providing collective goods (stability) and willing to do so. As it affects ECOWAS, Nigeria has been a leading force in view of her population, military strength and resource (oil). The research employed both primary (through interview) and secondary data. Also using documentary method of analysis, the study demonstrates that the rationale behind Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS’ effort in Mali was linked to her national interest ( expressed in terms of the fear of spill over of the conflict, her hegemonic ambition) and her West African policy of promoting peace and security within ECOWAS. The study equally revealed that Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS intervention in Mali was more contributory and supportive than transformative. The study also demonstrated that Nigeria scaled down her contribution to Mali and later with the degeneration of internal security situation, she pulled out her contingent to bolster the internal security concerns. Other factors that limit Nigeria’s role include; problems of logistics, intelligence, doctrine and training. From this experience, it is imperative for Nigeria to promote cordial relations with other non-ECOWAS countries in order to share intelligence on practical modalities of an intervention.
CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
Conflict constitutes one of the major features confronting the West African-sub-region and the world at large. The sub-region has always been in potential or actual antagonism between the political elite and militant groups. Accordingly, the fundamental incompatibility in most Post-Cold War conflicts did not revolve around disputes over territory between two or more states; rather they were disputes between two or more groups within a state. This incompatibility found expression in the ethnicisation of politics, the use of religion as a means of mobilization, the violent assertion of rights to self-determination, the collapse or near collapse of the state, resource conflicts and criminal activities through trading in precious minerals like diamond, oil, arms and drugs (Bolaji, 2010). This fact has been reinforced by the end of the Cold War which has not resulted in a reduction in number and intensity of conflicts in West Africa. Unlike in the 1970s when foreign military interventions were rampant in Africa, the dawn of the 1990s witnessed little or a half-hearted efforts at complementary regional conflict resolution efforts. This is probably as a result of the end of the Cold War politics and the shift in attention of the super powers to the geo-strategically explosive situations in the Persian Gulf. In this case, the end of Cold War was obviously a monumental disaster for the security of many post-colonial African states, exposing them to the full wrath of the majority poor citizens who had been impoverished by perverse economic performance of rulers since independence (Ate, 2011). Ate added that, these failings aggravated by social and economic dislocations, set the stage for explosion of intra-state conflicts across the continent. At the level of West Africa, the end of Cold War signified the explosion of civil war which exposed the challenges faced by the sub-region. Furthermore, Afisi (2009) observed that though conflicts in general are not always violent, nevertheless those that have plagued West Africa at community, state and regional levels have been characterized by violence. In countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone violent conflicts have led to population dislocation and wrecking of the socio-economic infrastructure. In August 1990, there were 225,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea, 150,000 in Cote d’Ivoire, 69,000 in Sierra Leone and a large population of Liberians in Nigeria. In the same vein, 5,000 people had been killed and about 3,000 Nigerians, Ghanaians and Sierra Leonean population were being held hostage by the insurgents from National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor (Oche, 2000). The destructive effects of such conflicts and their economic and security consequences have touched the conscience of many leaders, particularly Nigeria in the sub-region and left ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) with no other choice but respond in order to stop the carnage. Against this backdrop, peace and conflict resolution have emerged as issues of great concern in West Africa. In this respect, ECOWAS, which was initially established as an economic integration grouping has become entrusted with security and peacemaking functions in order to achieve these goals effectively, the ECOWAS Authority created the ECOWAS Monitory Observer Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990 to serve as an intervention Force in the sub-region. ECOMOG has since participated in restoring peace and security in most countries especially Sierra Leone and Liberia. Meanwhile, ECOWAS like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) where the command has been under the United States of America, needed leadership support by a sub-regional major power with influential status. It was thus expected and inevitable for Nigeria to play that role in view of the country’s status as Africa’s first oil producer, with an army of about 70,000, the second most important military power in sub-Saharan Africa, with a relatively developed manufacturing capacity and a pervasive influence on the economies of its immediate neighbours (Bach, 2007). A demonstration of Nigeria’s leadership role went beyond the provision of material and logistic support for ECOWAS to contributing bulk of its personnel in area of conflict resolution. For instance, Nigeria through ECOMOG was instrumental in resolving the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. ECOWAS thus provided enabling environment for the conduct of election in these countries (Nweke, 2007) Yet, ECOMOG was among other things viewed as a “child of circumstance” with no clear mandate in order to correct the limitations of ECOMOG, ECOWAS Mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution and security was adopted in 1999. In spite of this development, the recent resurgence of security and constitutional crisis in the Sahel affecting the West African countries of Guinea Bissau, Mali and Senegal sends alarming signal for Nigeria to assume a leading position in ECOWAS conflict situations, especially the case in Mali. In January 2012, a rebellion was launched by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) which culminated in the occupation of northern regions of Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao and the declaration of independence by the MNLA in March 2012. Against the background of armed attacks in these northern parts of Mali and the way in which the Malian government was managing the conflict, President Amadou Tourmani Toure was overthrown in a military coup, led by Captain Sanogo on March 22, 2012 therefore plunging the country into a constitutional conflict. The security and constitutional crisis in Mali has thus aggravated a regional security emergency. By December 2012 approximately 155,000 Malian refugees moved to the neighboring countries of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger, while nearly 200,000 more people were displaced internally following the military intervention in March 2012 and the control of the key cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu of northern Mali by rebel movements like the Tuareg’s National Movements for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Ansar Dine group (UNHR: 2012).
1.2 Statement of Research Problem
Nigeria has played a stabilizing role in West African Affairs. She has evidently enhanced sub-regional peace and security through diplomatic initiative, military involvement, democratization and financial commitment. In line with her leading role, Nigeria recommended the formation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and intervened to quell the conflicts that followed the overthrow of the then President Samuel Doe of Liberia as well as the reinstatement of President Ahmed Kabbah in Sierra Leone. Consequently, the coup of March 2012 and the rebellion in northern Mali raised the question of role expectation for Nigeria and created a regional security emergency to ECOWAS member states; more particularly what is expected of Nigeria considering her past intervention, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This security and constitutional situation (in Mali) and the current security challenges in Nigeria, a sub-regional leader obviously raised concern about what Nigeria has done, under the auspices of ECOWAS in resolving the conflict in Mali. The study examines the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS’ bid to resolve the conflict in Mali.
1.2.1 Research Questions
The research questions associated with this study include the following:
- What informed Nigeria’s role within ECOWAS to resolve the Mali conflict?
- What role did Nigeria play in ECOWAS’ effort to resolve the conflict in Mali?
- What were the factors that militated against Nigeria’s performance in playing this role?
1.3 Objectives of The Study
The objectives of this research are as follows:
- To examine what informed Nigeria’s role in the ECOWAS conflict resolution initiative in Mali
- To examine the role Nigeria played in the overall ECOWAS’ effort to resolve the conflict in Mali
- To assess the factors that militated Nigeria’s performance
1.4 Assumptions
The research assumptions for the study are as follows:
- Nigeria’s involvement in managing the conflict in Mali was to enhance its
national interest and policy of promoting sub-regional peace and security.
- Nigeria did not play a leadership role in ECOWAS’ effort to resolve the conflict in Mali
- Nigeria’s domestic challenges, especially internal insecurity militated against her performance in Mali.
1.5 Significance of the Study
Over the years, there have been quite a number of works on ECOWAS intervention especially Nigeria’s role in the conflicts of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Such attempts are no doubt helpful but on the basis of this research it is observed that they may remain limited as they unavoidably focused more on ECOWAS Revised Treaty, and thus did not capture ECOWAS intervention under the 1999 Conflict Resolution Mechanism and 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. These works also ignored the possibility of Nigeria’s internal insecurity affecting the effectiveness of ECOWAS in Mali, looking back at its past intervention experiences in conflict situations like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Apparently, since 2011, Nigeria has witnessed recurrent insurgent activities, which have attracted government attention, including frequent deployment of soldiers to aid civilian population. The escalation of this insurgency is manifested in the insurgents’ attack on worship centres, police stations, military barracks, prisons, banks, beer parlours, media houses, motor park, schools and market places. Viewed against this background, this study becomes necessary, as it focuses on what Nigeria, under the auspices of ECOWAS did in Mali in the face of its domestic security concerns. This study then provides the opportunity for a possible up-to-date account. It is also significant because it examines the efficacy and effectiveness of ECOWAS conflict intervention approaches; as they are applied to bring peace, restore security, manage conflicts and provide the enabling environment for the sub-region( particularly Mali), to develop her socio-economic and political agenda, hence, the study hopes to enhance the policy process in this area. Also, as ECOWAS has taken up the challenge of resolving the conflict in Mali, it is important that proper awareness be created on the approaches employed in this regard. Consequently, this study intends to provide information for other interested academics, international community and diplomats.
1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATION
The study covers Nigeria’s involvement in ECOWAS intervention in Mali from 2012-2013 periods of two years. It specifically examines how Nigeria intervened and the impediments encountered under the 1999 Conflict Resolution Mechanism and 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. It then focused on whether Nigeria played a leadership role in Mali, looking at previous interventions and its (Nigeria) current internal security concerns. Moreover, the period of this conflict is a time in which ECOWAS was expected to further implement its instruments of conflict resolution in the face of resurgence of sub-regional conflicts in Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger and Senegal. Meanwhile the choice of Mali is necessitated by the need for, a more in-depth discussion of ECOWAS intervention therein and the fact that both Nigeria and Mali were embroided in internal security challenges. A limited number of respondents were interviewed because of the difficulty of acquiring information from other respondents. The main challenge encountered during data collection was the inaccessibility of information from Defence Headquarters and Defence College. No officer was ready to grant audience, they rather referred the researcher to the ECOWAS Commission and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is also challenge encountered by interviewees, in recalling dates of vital events. However, this limitation was supplemented by ECOWAS document and Internet Sources. Again, the researcher was limited to designated interviewees with no opportunity to independently draw respondents.
1.7 Methodology
1.7.1 Sources of Data
The research employed both primary and secondary data. Primary was obtained using interviews while secondary data was gotten from documents, books, journals and the internet. The primary data was obtained through interview conducted with Stakeholders representing three institutions; ECOWAS Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Military Component (i.e. Director of West African Affairs Division (WAAD) in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peace and Security Consultants in ECOWAS Commission and the Force Commander of AFISMA (An ECOWAS Intervention Force in Mali).These major Institutional Stakeholders are examined in terms of their relevance to the subject matter: ECOWAS COMMISSION: The ECOWAS Commission is an executive organ of ECOWAS charged with the responsibility of implementing the vision, mission and objectives of ECOWAS as well as the decisions emanating from community protocols and instrument. It serves as the administrative hub of all ECOWAS programmes, projects and activities. It is important to stress that ECOWAS Commission was previously regarded as ECOWAS Secretariat. It came about as a product of restructuring that commenced in 2006 and the need to assign increasing powers and responsibilities to the commission with greater emphasis on human dimensions of development. The Commission executes programmes and policies of the community under the general direction of the Authority of Heads of State and Government as well as Council of Ministers. For the purpose of this research, two respondents were identified from the Department of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping and Security in ECOWAS Commission: The Principal Programme Officer Documentation and Peace and Security Consultant respectively. An examination of the Principal Programme Officer Documentation of the Commission indicated his possession of eye-witness documents and great insight on conflict in Mali. His expertise is equally complemented by a Peace and SecurityConsultants who has been in the situation room of ECOWAS Early Warning System and was in constant touch with ECOWAS Contingent in Mali, when the conflict erupted. Above all, the position of these respondents on Nigeria’s involvement in Mali is generally regarded as a microcosm of direction of the 15- ECOWAS Member State including Nigeria and Mali. Also, other primary sources of data obtained in ECOWAS Commission were the Organization’s instruments and official reports such as the founding ECOWAS Treaty of 1975, Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993, ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,Peace keeping and Security 1999, Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001, ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework of 2008, ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light,their Ammunition and other related materials of 2006, ECOWAS Annual Reports, ECOWAS Bulletins, Reports of ECOWAS Authority(of Head of State and Government) as well as Council of Minister, Mediation and Security Council MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Another important institution to this study is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry handles external relations of Nigeria’s vision and ideal by maintaining relations with other States and International Organizations like ECOWAS. It presents and protects the interest of Nigeria on external issues as well as organizes and supplies the activities of Nigeria’s mission abroad. However, the target respondent from this Ministry is Department of West African Affairs Division (WAAD) which addresses issues having link with West Africa to which the Conflict in Mali is no exception. The Department serves as Liaiason office between Federal Republic of Nigeria and Nigeria’s Mission in Mali as well as the Republic of Mali. The Department especially the Director has been in possession of eye-witness mails since when the conflict in Mali started. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: A very important Stakeholder to the research is the Military Institution. The main duty of the Defence Forces is to to defend the state from external and internal aggressors. The Defence Foces may equally be called upon to join in Peace-keeping Operations in other Countries as seen in ECOWAS, United Nations and African Union. For many years Nigeria has been in the fore front of ECOWAS Conflict Management Approaches. It has influenced and improved the conflict situation within the sub-region. Nigerian Military has some Major Institutions which comprises; the Defence Headquarters, Defence College Abuja, and Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC). However, the final choice of one respondent was in part dictated by access. The Respondent, Former Force Commander to AFISMA, an ECOWAS intervention force in Mali. His selection is due to his personal involvement (eye-witness account) and his experience on the subject matter. He participated in ECOWAS Peace-keeping operation in Liberia, Sierra Leone and more recently Mali. He was equally a one-time Military Secretary. Thus was a custodian of documents of all army officers in Nigeria including the Peace Operation in Mali. Therefore the rationale for selecting the interviewees is based on their position, expertise and personal involvement on the subject matter.
1.7.2 Data Collection Procedures
As indicated above both primary and secondary data is acquired for this research. The primary data was gathered through the use of Interview Technique. Three of the Respondents were visited in their different official capacity while one was interviewed on private level (after retirement). Before interview, the researcher requested the consent of the respondents through letter of introduction (From Department of Political Science, A.B.U. Zaria). Regrettably, only one respondent accepted the use of recorder for the interview process. Thus, the researcher conbined both recording and note-taking for information gathering. The interview involves personal (face-to-face) discussion which was semi structured with an interview question guide. Thus the interview has seven (7) list of questions that were covered, but interrogated further when new issue arise in the course of interview. This interview method involves questioning and discussion on the issue. Similar set of question was used for the respondents to provide information that may be regarded as official secret to some but not a secret to others. Timeline of the interview was determined by the peculiarities of each interviewee, though a minimum of forty-five (45) minutes was envisaged by the researcher. Consequently, interviews and discussions were recorded and transcribed word-to-word. This interview transcript is presented at appendix in order not to interrupt the flow of the text if it were presented in the body of the work. Inaddition, the field experience exposed the researcher to limited access to other important Stakeholders. As request to conduct interview was not honoured in Defence Headquarters, Defence College Abuja, Peace- keeping Unit of Staff College and Command Training School Jaji as well as the Embassy of the Republic of Mali in Abuja which is expected to give authoritative position of the Government of Mali. After longtime of silence, the researcher further did a follow-up of these institutions whose response is still being awaited. However, this challenge was improved and complemented by some documents and internet source.The problems and obstacles faced in this regard is in a way understandable in that the area under study is an aspect of Defence and Security which most institutions regard as official secrets and access. On the otherhand, unpublished works and articles from academic journals were sourced from the Post Graduate Library, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences Library and Kashim Ibrahim Library of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Inaddition, Books on Conflict and Conflict management as well as Magazines and Newspaper were accessed from the Northern History Research Scheme Library History Department A.B.U. and Cente for Democracy, Development Resaerch and Trainning (CEDDRT). Books on Conflict were equally gotten from Staff College and Command Training School LibraryJaji.
1.7.3 Method of Data Analysis
The data collected was analyzed using Documentary Analysis.This method involves a careful consideration of range of related questions and selection of only important and relevant or important element or setting from documents. Such documents normally include Statutory Instruments, Annual Reports, Statistical Reports, Bulletins, and Newsletters, from Government Department, Ministries, Parastatals and other Government Agencies. The data collected either from the Library or from Government Agencies are presented, analysed and conclusions drawn there from (Ngu, 2009).Clearly, it combines both the elements of Interpretive and Comparative Analysis. Interpretive Method relates an event to another and described it within a broader content, while Comparative Analysis examines similarities and differences in events. In this wise, information relevant to the research questions and objectives was identified and analyzed thematically, making deductions and inferences from the available data. Also, quotation and insight from the interview were simultaneously collaborated with secondary data.
1.8 Outline of Chapters
This research consists of five chapters. Chapter one deals with the general overview of the study and introduces these segments; background to the study, statement of problem, research objectives, assumptions, and research methodology.There is also the scope and limitation of the study as well as the general outline of chapters.
Chapter two gives a review of relevant literature on Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Resolution Debate, The role of Nigeria in United Nations intervention, Nigeria’s Conflict Management Efforts in Africa , ECOWAS Conflict Resolution Efforts in previous conflict situations and the role of Nigeria in sub-regional conflicts.
Chapter three explains ECOWAS Conflict Management Framework, especially 1999 Mechanism, 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and Nigeria’s West African policy. In addition, chapter four explains the role of Nigeria within ECOWAS’ intervention in Mali in the light of research questions, objectives and assumptions. Finally, chapter five concentrates on the summary, conclusion and recommendations from the preceding chapters.
